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Abstract: 
Amid global financial turbulent, the economy of Indonesia posted an annual average growth 
of above 6 per cent between 2008 and 2012, except in 2009. This was arguably among the 
most stable growth performance among the regional economies of East and Southeast Asia.  
The strength of domestic demand has indeed been a primary driver of the remarkably stable 
growth performance. However, the uncertainties with the advanced economies, particular in 
the US and the European Union, had negatively affected the local economy and exposed a 
number of apparent weaknesses with the Indonesian economy. A couple of these 
vulnerabilities are worth highlighted as they are arguably structural in nature. First is the 
country banking sector’s exposure to global cross-border bank lending activities. Second 
factor has to do with the persistent current account deficit and its link to long-standing fiscal 
policy of fuel subsidy and global commodity market.   
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1. Brief Introduction 
Amid global financial turbulent, the economy of Indonesia posted an annual average 
growth of above 6 per cent between 2008 and 2012, except in 2009. This was arguably 
among the most stable growth performance among the regional economies of East and 
Southeast Asia.  The strength of domestic demand has indeed been a primary driver of the 
remarkably stable growth performance. In contrast to the major Southeast Asian (ASEAN) 
economies, exports of Indonesia amounted to only less than 25 per cent of its GDP, 
compared to Malaysia more than 80 per cent and Thailand more than 60 per cent in recent 
years. Private consumption contributed between 44 to 49 per cent of the quarterly year-on-
year GDP growth in 2012 (Figure 1). Indonesia has also seen investment to pick up in recent 
years, and the country’s resilient growth in 2008-2012 can also be attributed to high 
commodity prices and capital inflow surges.  
Figure 1: Domestic Demand Driven Economy 
 
 
Despite the large domestic demand base, the uncertainties with the advanced 
economies, particular in the US and the European Union, had negatively affected and 
exposed a number of apparent weaknesses with the Indonesian economy. In particular, a 
couple of these vulnerabilities are worth highlighted as they are arguably structural in nature. 
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First is the country banking sector’s exposure to cross-border bank lending activities. Like 
the rest of the ASEAN economies, banking sector assumes a vital role in the overall 
financing activity in the local economy. Among the major ASEAN economies, Indonesia 
arguably adopts the most-open banking sector regulation. Majority foreign ownership rule, as 
high as 100 per cent, has long been adopted following the outbreak of 1997 East Asian 
crisis. Furthermore, foreign banks are allowed to enter the local industry both as a branch or 
a subsidiary. The high interconnectedness of the local banking sector to the global banks 
exposed the local economy to increasingly volatile cross-border bank lending flows as 
evident particularly during the deleveraging of the European banks in 2011.  
Second is with the current account weaknesses. The persistent current account 
deficits over a number of quarters in recent years have brought about concerns over 
macroeconomic stability of the country, causing marked depreciation pressures on the local 
currency. Most concerning, the primary root cause of the current account deficit has been 
attributed to long-standing and costly energy-subsidy of the fiscal policy and heavy reliance 
on commodity exports. On the back of weak external demand, especially from the major 
traditional trading partners of the advanced economies, and the volatile commodity price, 
especially oil price, subsidy measures have not only amplified fiscal burden, but also 
contributed to the robust import and weakening trade balance positions in recent quarters.         
   With the above issues at the centre of discussions, the roadmap of the paper will 
be as follows. Next section will briefly introduce selected key challenges facing the 
management of balance of payment of the country during the turbulent period of 2008 and 
2012. Section 3 reviews issues surrounding persistent current account deficit reported in 
recent years. In particularly, the focus will be on highlighting the root causes of the deficit 
and the possible links to the overall management of fiscal in the country. Section 4 tables a 
number of issues facing the globally and regionally integrated banking sector in Indonesia 
during the recent years. A brief concluding remark section, focusing on the economic outlook 
of the country and major policy issues, ends the paper. 
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2. Navigating through Turbulent: Brief Overviews of Balance Payment Performance 
 As in many parts of East and Southeast Asia, balance of payment position of 
Indonesia improved significantly following the Lehman Brothers collapse in late 2008 (Figure 
2). Moreover, the balance of payment performance until end of 2012 had been the story of 
two opposite forces of strong capital and financial account coupled with weak current 
account position. Strong economic growth, stable macroeconomic environment and high 
yields in the country attracted abundant global liquidity on the back of quantitative easing 
measures by major advanced economies. Capital and financial account surplus was in 
persistent surplus from the third quarter of 2009 to second quarter 2011. These quarterly 
surpluses coincided with the significant amount of liquidity injection to the global economies 
via quantitative measures by the US Fed, Bank of England and Bank of Japan (Table 1 and 
also see Table A.1 in the appendix). The return of high uncertainties in Eurozone area in the 
beginning of 2012 triggered another round of capital and financial account surplus until end 
of 2012. In a sharp contrast, we have seen relatively weak current account position with mild 
surpluses in 2010 turned into deficits since third quarter of 2011.  At the end of first quarter 
of 2013, Indonesia experienced the first capital and financial account deficit since second 
quarter of 2009, and the largest balance of payment deficit in the past decade (Table 2).        
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Figure 2: Balance of Payment 
 
Source: CEIC database 
 
Table 1: Consolidated QE Amounts for Selected Periods (USD billion) 
 
USD bn Pre-QE: 
Sep ’08       
to Feb ‘09 
Mar ’09     
to Oct ‘09(a)
Nov ’09     
to Oct ‘10(b)
Nov ’10     
to Jun ‘11(c) 
Jul ’11     
to Aug ‘12(d) 
Sep ’12     
to Apr ‘13(e)
U.S. Fed (changes in securities held)  102.1 1,108.5 354.1 604.1 -72.4 474.1 
BOE (changes in Gilts) 0.0 274.4 25.1 -0.5 235.1 42.7 
BOJ (changes in JGBs & Others)  0.0 0.0 255.7 203.2 284.2 162.1 
Total 102.1 1,382.9 634.8 806.7 446.9 678.9 
 
Notes:  
(a) Period refers to U.S. Fed QE1 and start of BOE Asset Purchase Facility 
(b) October 2010 is the start of BOJ’s Asset Purchase Program 
(c) Period refers to U.S. Fed QE2 
(d)  Re-launch of the BOE Asset Purchase Facility 
(e)  Period refers to U.S. Fed QE3. QE3 is still continuing, however, period is up to April 2013 only due to data availability  
Sources: U.S. Fed, BOE and BOJ 
 
Table 2: Worsening Balance of Payment Position 
 
Source: CEIC database 
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1Q 4Q 3Q 2Q 1Q 4Q 3Q 2Q 1Q
CA ‐5.27 ‐7.65 ‐5.33 ‐7.99 ‐3.11 ‐2.30 0.77 0.27 2.95
Goods 1.64 0.80 3.19 0.82 3.81 6.60 9.70 9.22 9.26
Services ‐2.31 ‐3.32 ‐2.48 ‐2.91 ‐2.07 ‐3.11 ‐2.56 ‐3.13 ‐1.82
Income ‐5.69 ‐6.34 ‐6.91 ‐6.80 ‐5.90 ‐6.96 ‐7.42 ‐6.78 ‐5.52
Transfer 1.10 1.21 0.86 0.90 1.06 1.18 1.05 0.96 1.03
Capital 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Financial ‐1.37 11.83 5.88 5.10 2.10 0.19 ‐3.11 11.62 4.83
FDI 3.39 4.45 4.54 3.76 1.56 3.12 2.12 2.51 3.78
Portfolio 2.91 0.18 2.52 3.87 2.63 0.24 ‐4.57 5.21 2.92
Other ‐7.67 7.20 ‐1.18 ‐2.54 ‐2.09 ‐3.17 ‐0.66 3.90 ‐1.87
BoP ‐6.61 3.23 0.83 ‐2.81 ‐1.03 ‐3.73 ‐3.96 11.88 7.67
2012 2011
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2.1 Capital and Financial Account 
 The dynamics of foreign direct investment and other investment dominated the 
performance of capital and financial account of Indonesia in recent years. Foreign direct 
investment has become a key driver of the economic growth and balance of payment 
position of Indonesia. Primary and secondary sectors recorded annual surges of investment 
since 2009 (Table 3). On the primary sector, food and mining industries received the most 
increases in foreign direct investment in 2011 and 2012. As for the secondary sector, a wider 
range of sectors has been the targets of foreign investors from food industry to chemical and 
machinery. Foreign direct investment (FDI) contributed more than 70 per cent of the total 
investment in recent years. In 2010, the quarterly average of net direct investment to the 
country was more than tripled the number in 2009, and the rising trend continued in 2011 
and 2012. Accordingly, gross fixed capital formation (proxy of investment), reaching well 
above 30 per cent of GDP since 2009, has finally reached the level pre-1997 East Asian 
economic crisis and among the highest in Southeast Asia recent years.   
 
Table 3: Steady Surge of Investment across Sectors 
 
Source: CEIC database and Board of Investment of Indonesia database 
 Value Rank Value Growth (yoy) Rank Value
Growth 
(yoy) share Rank Value
Growth 
(yoy) share Rank
Primary Sector 3,042     4,870     60.1% 5,933  21.8% 24.2   1,695  4.7% 24.0
Food crops & plantation 751       8 1,236     64.6% 6 1,602  29.6% 6.5    7 314     -39.1% 4.5      7
Livestock 5           2            -55.3% 20       843.9% 0.1    2        -87.6% 0.0      
Forestry 39         14          -64.0% 27       89.7% 0.1    1        737.9% 0.0      
Fishery 18         10          -44.4% 29       189.9% 0.1    1        -78.3% 0.0      
Mining 2,229     2 3,608     61.8% 2 4,255  17.9% 17.3   1 1,376  27.1% 19.5    1
Secondary Sector 3,357     6,780     101.9% 11,770 73.6% 47.9   4,552  96.8% 64.6
Food Industry 1,026     5 1,098     7.0% 7 1,783  62.4% 7.3    6 405     5.4% 5.8 6
Textile Industry 155       498        221.9% 10 473     -5.1% 1.9    234     44.7% 3.3 8
Leather Goods & Footwear Industry 144       250        73.3% 159     -36.4% 0.6    25       -63.3% 0.4
Wood Industry 43         51          18.3% 76       49.6% 0.3    1        -91.1% 0.0
Paper and Printing Industry 46         258        456.5% 1,307  406.0% 5.3    9 579     509.0% 8.2 5
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry 798       6 1,466     83.6% 5 2,770  88.9% 11.3   3 1,228  228.5% 17.4 2
Rubber and Plastic Industry 105       371        253.5% 660     77.9% 2.7    122     -44.0% 1.7
Non Metallic Mineral Industry 28         137        383.1% 146     6.2% 0.6    30       -28.2% 0.4
Metal, Machinery & Electronics Industry 590       10 1,773     200.8% 4 2,453  38.3% 10.0   4 1,042  108.3% 14.8 3
Medical Preci & Optical Instru, Watches & Clock Industry 1           42          2892.9% 3         -91.9% 0.0    0        0.0
Motor Vehicles & Other Transport Equip. Industry 394       770        95.6% 9 1,840  138.9% 7.5    5 866     93.0% 12.3 4
Other Industry 26         65          146.2% 100     55.3% 0.4    18       105.6% 0.3
Tertiary Sector 9,815     7,825     -20.3% 6,862  -12.3% 27.9   801     -55.4% 11.4
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 1,428     3 1,865     30.5% 3 1,515  -18.8% 6.2    8 218     30.4% 3.1 10
Construction 620       9 283        -54.4% 240     -15.2% 1.0    31       72.7% 0.4
Trade and Repair 785       7 821        4.6% 8 484     -41.1% 2.0    216     36.9% 3.1 9
Hotel and Restaurant 312       240        -23.0% 768     219.5% 3.1    10 31       -84.6% 0.4
Transport, Storage & Communication 5,046     1 3,866     -23.4% 1 2,808  -27.4% 11.4   2 52       -93.2% 0.7
Real Estate, Ind. Estate & Business Activities 1,050     4 266        -74.7% 402     51.2% 1.6    117     61.8% 1.7
Other Services 574       485        -15.5% 646     33.2% 2.6    137     -66.9% 1.9
TOTAL 16,215   19,475    20.1% 24,565 26.1% 100.0 7,048  23.1% 100.0
in US$ Million (I)
2010 2011 2012 Q1 2013
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In contrast, portfolio and other investment have been the sources of volatility and 
weakness of the financial account position. While volatility has long been the feature 
associated with portfolio capital, the recent intermittent of sharp surges and pull-outs of other 
investment has increasingly become source of policy concern in the country. Other 
investment consists predominantly of international bank lending. The substantial sharp pull-
out of other investment was the primary source of financial and capital account deficit in the 
first quarter of 2013. Understanding further some of the root-causes of the fluctuations, in 
particular outflows, of international bank lending will be the primary objective of Section 4 of 
this paper. It is sufficient to note that Indonesia, amid the massive capital inflows in recent 
years, has seen a significant rise in the gross external debt from about USD141 billion at the 
end of 2007 to more than USD251 billion by end of 2012 (Table 4). A marked increase in the 
level of short-term external debts has largely been attributed to banks and non-bank financial 
institutions (corporates), issuing bonds to raise funding amid the low cost of funding. 
Table 4: Gross External Debt 
2007  2012 
End‐Period (USD billion)  Q4  % share  Q4  % share 
Gross external debt (by sectors)  141.2  100.0  251.2  100.0 
 General government and Monetary Authorities  80.6  57.1  126.1  50.2 
 Banks  9.9  7.0  22.9  9.1 
 Non‐bank Institutions  50.6  35.9  102.1  40.7 
Gross external debt (by maturity)  141.2  100.0  251.2  100.0 
 Long term debt  122.5   86.8  206.4   82.2 
Of which        
‐ General government and Monetary Authorities  77.6  55.0  118.7  47.3 
‐ Banks  2.6  1.8  6.2  2.5 
‐ Non‐bank Institutions  42.3  30.0  81.5  32.5 
 Short term debt  18.7   13.2  44.8   17.8 
Of which        
‐ General government and Monetary Authorities  3.0  2.1  7.4  3.0 
‐ Banks  7.4  5.2  16.7  6.7 
‐ Non‐bank Institutions  8.3  5.9  20.6  8.2 
Short term debt/international reserves ratio (%)  32.7   ‐  39.7   ‐ 
Short term debt/GDP ratio (%)  3.6   ‐  5.1   ‐ 
Short term debt/long term debt ratio (%)  14.2   ‐  21.7   ‐ 
 
 
2.2 Sustained Current Account Deficits 
As reported in Table 2, deficits accumulated in both service and income accounts 
contributed to the current account performance of Indonesia. Given the dependency of the 
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economy to external service sectors, such as financial services for instance, the deficit in the 
service account is expected and has in fact been largely stable over the last few years. 
Similarly, the large participation of foreign firms and foreign direct investment in the local 
economy has for years led to negative income of the current account balance. Looking at the 
trend of the income balance, the deficit has largely been steadily fluctuating within the range 
of USD5.5 billion to USD7 billion during the past 2-3 years. 
Observing closer the breakdowns of the current account balance, the deterioration in 
recent quarters can arguably be attributed to the worsening performance of goods trade 
account. From 2009 to 2011, the goods account recorded steady surpluses of around 
USD30.9 billion in 2009, USD 30.6 billion in 2010 and USD 34.8 billion in 2011. These 
healthy surpluses have kept the overall current account payment in positive on quarterly 
basis until end of 2011. However, in 2012 the net surplus dropped to only USD8.6 billion, 
with a mere 0.8 billion trade surplus reported in the final quarter of 2012. Next section will 
look into a number of primary root-causes of the deterioration of the goods trade in recent 
years.    
 
3. Structural Trade Balance Deficit  
3.1 Investment and Commodity Price Factors  
Strong growth, sound fiscal position and healthy financial market had led to a 
sequence of credit and investment rating upgrades by major rating agencies in 2011 and 
2012.1 Together with robust domestic consumption, investment surge, especially foreign 
direct investment, has in turn boosted strong import demand in the country since late 2011. 
                                                            
1 Moody’s upgraded Indonesia’s rating to Baa3 in January 2012, with a stable outlook, from a Ba1 
upgrade in January 2011. Fitch Ratings also upgraded Indonesia’s rating in February 2011 to BBB- 
with a stable outlook, from BB+ and a positive outlook. In April 2012, Standard & Poor’s affirmed its 
rating of BB+ and a positive outlook for the Indonesian economy. In October 2012, Rating and 
Investment Information Inc., (R & I) upgraded Indonesian’s sovereign credit rating to BBB- with a 
stable outlook on the ground that Indonesia had achieved high growth amid the global economic 
downturn; fiscal management was conservative; Government’s debt burden is relatively low and the 
financial system had become more stable. Most recently, in November 2012, Japan Credit Rating 
Agency Ltd., (JCR) affirmed for the second time Indonesia’s sovereign rating of BBB- with a stable 
outlook, having already upgraded the rating from BB+ in July 2010. 
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Non-oil and gas imports continued to expand robustly on annual basis with average monthly 
year-on-year growth rates of 27 per cent in 2011 and 17 per cent during the first six months 
of 2012 (Figure 3). Concurrently, weak global demands for the country’s export products 
have already been felt since late 2011. As such, a combination of weak exports and 
relatively robust import demand raised concerns over the possibility of the country facing a 
more sustained and structural trade deficit. 
In addition to strong investment, another root-cause of the worsening trade balance 
lies on the dependency on commodity exports, particularly oil and gas products. Imports of 
oil and gas made up around 22 per cent of total imports in 2011 and 2012. Similarly exports 
of oil and gas contributed to around 20 per cent of total exports for the same years. As also 
reported elsewhere in the region, commodity exports of Indonesia have performed worse 
than non-commodity exports in 2012 (Figures 4 and 5).   Furthermore, oil and gas exports 
and imports have been volatile, reflecting the swings in the commodity prices in the world 
market. 
Figure 3: Trade Balances 
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Figure 4: Non-Oil and Gas Exports and Imports  
(% yoy change) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Oil and Gas Exports and Imports  
(% yoy change) 
 
Source: CEIC database 
 
Soft global commodity markets continue to undermine export performance of 
commodity exporters in the region, including Indonesia. Cooling demand amid economic 
growth slowdowns in major global commodity markets, particularly China, has, to a large 
extent, depressed prices of major commodities. In turn, the fall in commodity prices and the 
slowdown in the global demand for commodities were the main reasons for the fall in 
Indonesia’s exports since second half of 2012, of which coal, copper and palm oil comprise a 
large portion (Figure 6). China has also recently put a restriction on low-quality coal, which 
makes up about one third of Indonesia's coal export to that country. Although this restriction 
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has not yet been implemented, China’s policy towards more environmentally friendly energy 
use may pose a threat to Indonesia’s coal export to China. Structural changes in the supply 
of energy fuels, in particular, the recent development of shale gas, may have had a 
persistent negative impact on Indonesia’s exports of natural gas and/or coal.  
Figure 6: Key Commodity Exports 
 
 
3.2 Subsidy Policy Distortion to Trade Performance 
 In addition to strong investment surge and the external factor discussed above, one 
of the key and long-standing contributors to robust imports of oil and gas has arguably been 
the subsidy policy of the national budget. Energy subsidy policy has been a key feature of 
central government fiscal policy of the country. In 2012, actual energy subsidy expenditure 
consumed over 30 per cent of total central government expenditure and was more than 40 
per cent higher than forecasted due to extra 76.1 billion rupiah of energy subsidy, 
predominantly fuel subsidy (Table 5). Given the fiscal rule that Indonesia has adopted since 
the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, the so-called Maastricht Treaty, which regulates less 
than three per cent of budget deficit and less than 60 per cent of public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
the large spending on subsidy means that Indonesia has to spend less for other productive 
spending, including social and capital spending.   
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Table 5: Subsidy Breakdowns in 2012 
  Revised 
Forecast 
(in billions of 
rupiah) 
% of Forecast 
Expenditure* 
Actual 
(in billions of 
rupiah) 
 
% of Actual 
Expenditure* 
Total Subsidies 245.1 22.9 346.4 34.3 
   Energy 230.4 21.5 306.5 30.4 
      Fuel 137.4 12.8 211.9 21.0 
      Electricity 93.1 8.7 94.6 9.4 
   Non-Energy 40.3 3.8 39.9 4.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance. Note: */ as % of Central Government total expenditure 
 
It has been well documented that sustained general administered price and subsidy 
could lead to a number unwanted distortionary consequences. One of them has to do with 
the impacts of global price movement on the local demand of the relevant good or product. 
Subsidy and administered price measures have to a large extent shielded domestic demand 
from the volatility of price. This feature is evident in Indonesia, as shown in Figure 7. The rise 
in the energy price in the world market has either limited or no impact at all on the domestic 
price of energy. Consequently, no demand adjustment to the price change took place. 
Despite the rise in the global energy price, imports of the oil and gas products in Indonesia 
climbed along.  This often resulted in further deterioration of trade balance and also rising 
cost of subsidy in the country.   
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Figure 7: Commodity Fuel (Energy) Monthly Price Index & Gas & Oil Imports 
 
 
Source: Index Mundi and CEIC.2 
 
4. Globalized Banking Sector  
4.1 Brief Historical Perspectives 
To comprehend the openness of the banking sector in Indonesia, one needs to 
review its situation following the aftermath of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. On 
November 1, 1997, the day after the first IMF agreement with Indonesia was signed, the 
government announced the liquidation of 16 banks. The banking restructuring program was 
one of two cornerstones of the IMF-led recovery programs. In addition to the liquidation 
program, a number of commercial banks (private and public) received recapitalised bonds, 
totalling about 435 billion US dollar (Siregar (2005)). These banks include 4 state banks and 
7 major private banks. Following the restructuring of their balance sheets, most of these 
recapitalized private banks were eventually taken over by foreign investors. In addition to the 
vast potential market, with a high share of population having still limited access to banking 
service, friendly foreign ownership policy allowing majority ownership to a single foreign 
investor has become the major pull-factor behind the massive take-overs in the banking 
sector. Presently, Indonesian banking system is arguably the most open banking sector 
among the Southeast Asian (ASEAN) economies. Major private commercial banks are 
                                                            
2 Index Mundi web‐site: (http://www.indexmundi.com/commoditie/?commodity=energy‐price‐
index&months=60)  
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predominantly controlled by global and regional investors, as shown in Table 6. Based on 
survey conducted by Siregar and Lim (2010), a number of these rescued commercial banks 
has established themselves among the largest and most influential banks in Indonesia in 
recent years.     
Table 6: Foreign Ownership in Domestic Banks 
Bank Foreign Owner Foreign Share Total Assets* 
  (%) Rp Trillion % 
CIMB Niaga CIMB Group Sdn Bhd, 
Malaysia 
77.0 100.7 4.29 
Danamon Temasek Holdings, Singapore 67.9 98.0 4.17 
Panin ANZ Bank, Australia 35.0 72.2 3.07 
Permata Standard Chartered Bank, UK 44.5 56.8 2.42 
BII Maybank, Malaysia 54.3 54.5 2.32 
Buana UOB, Singapore 91.0 22.4 0.95 
Ekonomi Raharja HSBC, Hong Kong 99.0 21.2 0.90 
BTPN Texas Pacific, USA 71.6 19.3 0.82 
ANK Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia 
83.0 10.9 0.46 
Bumiputera Che Abdul Daim, Malaysia 58.3 6.5 0.28 
Mustika Dharma RHB Capital Berhad, Malaysia 80.0 5.3 0.23 
Nusantara Tokyo Mitsubishi, Japan 75.4 4.0 0.17 
Halim 
International 
ICBC, China 90.0 3.5 0.15 
Swadesi Bank of India 76.0 1.5 0.06 
Indomonex Bank of India 76.0 n.a. n.a. 
Total    476.8 20.31 
*/Based on 2009 audited reports. ‘n.a’ = not available. Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange 
and Wie and Negara (2010). 
The alleged advantages of opening the local financial markets to the foreign banks 
are well-documented. Under the presence of foreign banks, emerging markets have 
benefitted from efficiency gains manifested in the form of greater variety in financial services 
and lower prices; transfer and spill-over of knowledge and technical know-how as well as 
greater availability of funding most especially to credit-constrained firms and households. 
Foreign bank lending has also been found to be more stable during the past economic and 
financial crises originated from the emerging markets. Balance sheets of the Indonesian 
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banks, particularly capital adequacy position, non-performing loan level and profitability, 
continued to remain sound and among the best in the region, amid the global financial 
turbulent (Figures 8-10).  
 
Figure 8: Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
 
Source: IMF database 
 
Figure 9: Ratio of Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 
 
Source: IMF database 
Figure10: Return on Equity 
 
 
Source: IMF database 
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4.2 Headwinds and Recent Debates 
The sudden interruption to this spectacular rise in international bank lending during 
the recent 2007/2008 global financial crisis serves as a stark reminder that international 
bank lending can rapidly transmit adverse shocks from developed markets to emerging 
markets. Total international bank claims to Indonesia reached over 92 billion US dollar by 
third quarter of 2012, more than 400 per cent of the level reported at the first quarter of 2005. 
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, total foreign bank claims contracted 
only in fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 by about 4.9 billion and 750 million US 
dollar, respectively (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Total International Bank Claims to Indonesia 
(in millions of USD) 
 
Source: BIS database 
Assessing more deeply into the major international bank lenders, it is clear that the 
global financial turbulence has affected the Indonesian banking system through the lending 
of major global banks from the crisis-affected advanced economies. The claims of the US 
banks and the Eurozone banks were in declining trends from the first half of 2011 and 
showed mild rebounds in the third quarter of 2012 (Figure 12). Consolidation of the bank 
balance sheet, particularly among the Eurozone banks, has resulted on deleveraging from 
their exposures to Indonesia in two periods. The first occurred from quarter 1, 2008 to 
quarter 2, 2010, resulted in more than USD5 billion pull-outs. The second round of 
deleveraging, taking place more recently between first quarter of 2011 and second quarter of 
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2012, resulted in lending cut by more than USD7.5 billion. In contrast, the UK and the 
Japanese banks expanded their lending without marked interruptions.  
Figure 12: Total International Bank Claims across Major Lenders 
 
 
Source: BIS database 
Beyond just the numbers, there are several fundamental challenges highlighted by 
the withdrawals of claims by the international banks to Indonesia. First one is the degree of 
exposure as highlighted by the share of the cross-border lending vis-à-vis local lending of 
these banks to Indonesia. Second is the allocation of these claims in Indonesia, particularly 
on the sovereign bond markets. These aforementioned issues will be elaborated in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
4.2.1 Cross-border Lending 
What has been learnt from the recent experiences of sudden reversals of 
international bank lending? Recent studies such as Pontines and Siregar (2011), Kamil and 
Rai (2010) and de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) demonstrate that cross-border operations 
of international banks are more prone to a “sudden stop” and sharp reversal during 
economic downturns in source economies. By definition, the total claims of international 
banks can be decomposed into: (a). lending by the local branch or subsidiary of the foreign 
bank or often refer to as local lending; and (b). cross-border lending –lending from the head-
quarter or another branch or subsidiary of the bank located in another country. As shown in 
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Figure 13, around 50 per cent of the total international bank claims to Indonesia came in the 
form of cross-border lending. The high shares of cross-border claims of the Eurozone banks 
in major Asian economies, including Indonesia, have partly explained to the relatively 
marked declines in the total claims of the Eurozone banks in the region. Compared to major 
Latin American economies, claims of the Eurozone banks to Indonesia have predominantly 
been in the form of cross-borders (Table 7).  
Figure 13: Shares of Cross-border Claims in Total Foreign Claims 
(as of fourth quarter of 2011) 
 
Note: HK: Hong Kong; MY: Malaysia; TH: Thailand; SG: Singapore; JP: Japan; KR: Korea; BN: Brunei; ID: 
Indonesia; VN: Vietnam; KH: Cambodia; CN: China; PH: Philippines; MM: Malaysia; and LA: Laos.  
 
Table 7: Share of Cross-Border Lending of the Eurozone Bank Lending  
 
 Total Foreign 
Claims* (in US$ bn) 
(a) 
Cross-Border 
Claims* (in US$ bn) 
(b) 
Ratio (a/b) 
in % 
ASEAN+3    
1. China 91 60.8 66.8 
2. Indonesia 14 10.9 77.8 
3. Korea 68 49.0 72.1 
 
Latin America 
 
   
1. Argentina 24 6.4 26.7 
2. Brazil 285 68.7 24.1 
3. Mexico 179 31.2 17.4 
 
*/Data as of the second quarter of 2011.  Source: BIS database 
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4.2.2 Participation on Bond Market 
The significance and potential impacts of foreign banks’ activities are not only to be 
measured by the size of their claims, but also the allocations of these funding. More than 20 
per cent of total claims of international banks to East and Southeast Asian economies were 
invested in sovereign bonds. Similarly, banks in Indonesia have played a major role in 
foreign investors’ participation on the domestic bond markets, especially sovereign bonds, in 
Indonesia. Considered to be a relatively safer asset, especially following the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers, with one of the highest yields in the region and the globe, local currency 
denominated sovereign bonds issued by the central banks (Bank Indonesia Certificate) and 
by the government of Indonesia (IDR Bond) had attracted foreign investors during the past 
few years (Figure 14). Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the foreign investors’ 
holding of Bank Indonesia certificate plunged from 54.7 trillion rupiah (slightly over USD 6 
billion) in July 2008 to a mere 6.5 trillion rupiah (or slightly over USD 720 million) in 
November 2008. The participation rebounded and peaked at 87.1 trillion rupiah in April 2011.  
Figure 14: 
Holdings of Sovereign Bond and Bank Indonesia Certificate by Foreign Investors 
 
 
Source: Bank Danamon International, Bank Indonesia and Ministry of Finance, Indonesia. 
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complicate the conduct of open market operation. These have also been the experiences of 
Indonesia in recent years. To reduce short-term volatility, Bank Indonesia introduced a one-
month holding period for its certificate purchased in both primary and secondary markets in 
June 2010 and prior to that the central bank has also launched a concerted effort to shift the 
maturity structure from one-month to longer term maturity. The policy has largely been 
effective in arresting foreign investor participation in its Central Bank Certificates (SBI). By 
January 2012, the foreign investor’s holding of SBI was less than 9 per cent of its peak in 
April 2011.  
The holding of government bonds by the foreign investors, including banks, however, 
continued to expand until early 2013. In recent months, particular since early second quarter 
of 2013, bond markets (corporate and sovereign) in Indonesia and the region in general 
have seen massive sell-outs, largely driven by the anticipation of tapering of quantitative 
easing measures in the US. While the rise in the foreign demand for government bonds 
sustained low cost of financing, as shown in the yield curve of the five-year government 
bond, the recent sell-outs by foreign investors have raised the yield curve (Table 8). The 
wide swings of the sovereign bond yields certainly would complicate and escalate the 
financing cost of budget deficits. 
Table 8: 5-Year Local Government Bond Yield Curves of Major ASEAN Economies 
(January 2007 – June 2013) 
 Level as of mid-
June 2013 
Maximum Minimum 
Korea 3.1 5.8 2.5 
Singapore 1.6 3.9 0.8 
Thailand 3.3 7.2 2.6 
Malaysia 3.8 5.8 2.7 
Indonesia 7.4 10.4 4.4 
Source: Nomura (2013) and Bloomberg 
 
5. Brief Concluding Remarks on Outlook and Policy Challenges     
Balancing the need to improve fiscal management and current account position in 
one hand, while maintaining steady economic growth will be more challenging in the near 
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future for the policy makers in Indonesia. Concerns have emanated over Indonesia’s weak 
external position, with the country positing a staggering USD 6.6 billion deficit in its balance 
of payment in the first quarter of 2013. The deficit was mainly attributed to the weak 
performance of the country’s current account with a deficit of USD5.27 billion or 2.4 per cent 
of GDP. Continuing pressures on the "bleeding" fiscal budget from fuel subsidies, the threats 
of inflation, and the widening current account deficit has led to the eventual outlook revision 
by S&P from BB+ rating from positive to stable in May 2013. Declining Balance of Payment 
has put pressures on the Rupiah that necessitated Bank Indonesia to intervene. As a result, 
International reserve has declined from the record high US$125 billion in 2011 to less than 
US$100 billion by July 2013, exacerbated by portfolio outflows due to the news on the Fed 
increasing the interest rate and potential winding down of the quantitative easing measures 
or QE3.   
To reduce subsidy pressure on the budget, the government made a revision to the 
2013 national budget.  The key features of the revised Budget approved by the parliament 
on June 17, 2013, were a revision of projected spending on fuel subsidies and a package of 
compensation measures designed to reduce the impact of higher fuel prices on the poor 
(including direct cash transfer, rice for the poor and children's scholarship).  The rise in 
subsidized fuel prices was made effective on June 22 with the subsidized petrol prices rising 
by 44 per cent to Rp. 6,500.00 per litter and the subsidized diesel price increasing by 22 per 
cent Rp. 5,500.00 per litter.  The 2013 deficit has been revised upwards by 0.7 percentage 
points to 2.4 per cent of GDP, due to lower projected nominal revenues, in line with weaker 
anticipated GDP growth, and higher total expenditure (including on fuel subsidies, despite 
the increase in subsidized prices, due to higher projected global oil prices). The move to 
phase fuel subsidies is also wise considering that the Statistical Review of World Energy 
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2013 showed that Indonesia may run out of oil by 2024, holding constant the figures for 
production and proven reserves.3 
On the back of rising fuel price and its wide spread impacts on headline inflation and 
the weak rupiah stemming by market concerns over current account deficits, Bank Indonesia 
increased its policy rate (the BI rate) by 25 basis point in June and another 50 basis point in 
July. These rate adjustments had to be taken amid soaring inflationary pressures coming 
from the fuel price increase. In addition, Bank Indonesia adjusted its growth target range 
between 5.8 to 6.2 per cent, lower than 6.3 per cent target of the government.  
On the financial market front, especially banking sector, the challenges facing 
financial sector supervisors become more complex globally, including those in the emerging 
markets of East and Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia. The banking sectors are not only 
deeply interconnected regionally, but also globally. As elaborated, the local and regional 
banks have not only borrowed heavily from, but also extended loans to global banking 
system. The traditional global banks, such as the HSBC and the Standard Chartered bank, 
have increasingly become regional banks. At the same time, many of the ASEAN banks, 
such as the DBS, OCBC, UOB, MayBank and the CIMB, have become regional and global 
banks. Accordingly, the need to integrate financial market supervisory agencies is no longer 
a domestic issue (Lim and Siregar (2010)). Given the cross-border nature of these banks’ 
operations, the regular supervision on domestic activities of these banks will not be sufficient 
to assess the overall risk exposures. There are a number of lessons from the recent global 
financial crisis that underscore the importance of establishing a closer coordination among 
banking supervisors across the borders.  
 
  
                                                            
3 Siahaan, Tito Summa, “Indonesia Coal, Oil May Be Depleted in 10 Years: BP,” The Jakarta Globe, 
June 14, 2013. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Quantitative Easing and Other Key Extraordinary Measures by Major Central Banks 
 US Fed BOJ BOE ECB 
2001-2006  Forerunner of central bank extraordinary measures. To 
combat deflation, weak growth and stabilize the 
financial system, the BOJ brought down interest rates 
to zero, introduced quantitative easing, credit easing 
and stock purchases. Further the BOJ also extended 
the maturity of funds supplying operations, while at the 
same time making commitments on the duration of zero 
interest rate and quantitative easing.  
  
2007    ECB provides liquidity to permit orderly functioning of 
the money market and announces supplementary 
three-month €40 billion longer-term refinancing 
operation (LTRO). (August) 
2008 QE1, the Federal Reserve will purchase agency debt of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together with MBS 
guaranteed by these institutions. The Fed announces the 
creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF) to provide liquidity to the ABS market. 
(Nov. 25) 
  The ECB decides to carry out weekly refinancing 
operations with a fixed-rate tender procedure with full 
allotment (FRFA). (Oct. 8) 
2009 QE1 (continued), the FOMC announces it will purchase 
longer-term Treasury securities (US$300 billion) over the 
next six months. (March 18) 
 Asset Purchase Program 1, the MPC 
announces its first round of asset 
purchases, consisting mostly of 
conventional bonds with residual maturity 
between five to 25 years. (March 5) 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) 
announced for €60 billion, one-year program.  
(May 7) 
2010 QE2, the FOMC announces intention to purchase a 
further US$600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities 
by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about 
US$ 75 billion per month. (Nov. 3) 
Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME), 
announcement of purchases of Japanese government 
bonds (JGBs), commercial paper, corporate bonds, 
exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japanese real 
estate investment trusts (J-REITs). (Oct. 5) 
 Securities Market Program (SMP) launched to ensure 
depth and liquidity in sovereign debt markets. (May 9) 
2011 Operation Twist or Maturity Extension Program, the 
FOMC announces its intention to purchase US$400 billion 
of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of six 
years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury 
securities with remaining maturities of three years or less. 
(Sept. 21) 
 Asset Purchase Program 2, the MPC 
announces another round of purchases 
amid sluggish growth (Oct. 6) 
The ECB announced two three-year LTROs on Dec. 
20, 2011 and Feb. 28, 2012, together with reduced 
reserve ratio and expanded collateral availability. (Dec. 
8) 
2012 QE3, The FOMC will purchase US$40 billion MBS a 
month (Sept.13) and longer-term Treasury securities at an 
initial pace of US$45 billion per month (Dec. 12) 
 Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), 
designed to increase lending to 
households and businesses by providing 
banks cheaper costs of funds. (July 12) 
Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) released, including strict and effective 
conditionality. (Sept. 6) 
2013  Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQME), 
announcement of intensified asset purchases with the 
goal of increasing the monetary base by JPY 60 to JPY 
70 trillion annually, increasing the average maturity of 
JGBs held from three to seven years and meeting the 2 
percent inflation target in two years. (April 4) 
  
Source: Shirakawa (2009) and IMF 2013 
